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The generation of random numbers via quantum processes is an efficient and reliable method to
obtain true indeterministic random numbers that are of vital importance to cryptographic commu-
nication and large-scale computer modeling. However, in realistic scenarios, the raw output of a
quantum random-number generator is inevitably tainted by classical technical noise. The integrity
of the device can be compromised if this noise is tampered with, or even controlled by some malicious
party. To safeguard against this, we propose and experimentally demonstrate an approach that pro-
duces side-information independent randomness that is quantified by min-entropy conditioned on
this classical noise. We present a method for maximizing the conditional min-entropy of the number
sequence generated from a given quantum-to-classical-noise ratio. The detected photocurrent in our
experiment is shown to have a real-time random-number generation rate of 14 (Mbit/s)/MHz. The
spectral response of the detection system shows the potential to deliver more than 70 Gbit/s of
random numbers in our experimental setup.
I. INTRODUCTION
Randomness is a vital resource in many information
and communications technology applications, such as
computer simulations, statistics, gaming, and cryptog-
raphy. For applications that are not concerned with the
security and uniqueness of randomness, a sequence with
uniformly distributed numbers mostly suffices. Such se-
quences can be generated using a pseudorandom-number
generator (PRNG) that works via certain deterministic
algorithm. Although PRNGs can offer highly unbiased
random numbers, they cannot be used for applications
that require information security for two reasons: First,
PRNG-generated sequences are unpredictable only under
limitations of computational power, since PRNGs are in-
herently based on deterministic algorithms. Second, the
random seeds, which are required to define the initial
state of a PRNG, limit the amount of entropy in the
random-number sequences they generate. This compro-
mises the security of an encryption protocol.
For cryptographic applications [1], a random sequence
is required to be truly unpredictable and to have max-
imum entropy. To achieve this, intensive efforts have
been devoted to developing high-speed hardware RNGs
that generate randomness via physical noise [2–6]. Hard-
ware RNGs are attractive alternatives because they pro-
vide fresh randomness based on physical processes that
are apparently unpredictable (i.e. uncorrelated with any
existing information either with past settings or side in-
formation). Moreover, they also provide a solution to
the problem of having insufficient entropy. Because of
the deterministic nature of classical physics, however,
some of these hardware generators may be only truly
∗ jing.yan@anu.edu.au
random under practical assumptions that cannot be vali-
dated. RNGs that rely on quantum processes (QRNGs),
on the other hand, can have guaranteed indeterminism
and entropy, since quantum processes are inherently un-
predictable [7, 8]. Examples of such processes include
quantum phase fluctuations [9–13], spontaneous emis-
sion noise [14–16], photon arrival times [17–19], stimu-
lated Raman scattering [20], photon polarization state
[21, 22], vacuum fluctuations [23, 24], and even mo-
bile phone cameras [25]. These QRNGs resolve both
shortcomings of the PRNGs. However, despite their re-
liance on entropy which is ultimately guaranteed by the
laws of quantum physics, measurements on quantum sys-
tems are often tainted by classical noise. We quantify
the amount of quantum randomness to the amount of
classical noise using a quantum-to-classical-noise ratio
(QCNR). When QCNR is low, both the quality and the
security of the random sequence generated may be com-
promised [24, 26, 27].
To address this issue, Gabriel et al. [24] took into ac-
count potential eavesdropping on the classical noise by
considering the channel capacity of their QRNG. Their
setup exhibited a good QCNR clearance and was able to
extract approximately 3 bits per sample of guaranteed
randomness out of 5 bits of digitization (approximately
60%). More recently, Ma et al. [26] proposed a framework
for QRNG entropy evaluation . By using min-entropy as
the quantifier for randomness, they extracted a higher
rate of random bits of 6.7 bits per sample from 8 bits
(approximately 84%), where the quantum contribution
of the randomness was obtained by inferring the QCNR.
In the process of generating random bits via mea-
suring continuous-variable systems, an analog-to-digital
converter (ADC) is commonly used to discretize the mea-
surement outcomes. It has been speculated [12] that
the freedom of choosing the ADC range could be ex-
ploited to optimize extractable randomness. Meanwhile,
2in Refs. [28, 29], the choice of dynamical ADC range was
justified by experimental observations. Thus, a system-
atic approach to determine the dynamical ADC range in
extracting a maximum amount of secure randomness is
very much required.
In this work, we propose a new generic framework
where the dynamical ADC range can be appropriately
chosen to deliver maximum randomness. By quantify-
ing randomness via min-entropy conditioned on classical
noise, we show that QCNR is not the sole limiting fac-
tor in generating secure random bits. In fact, by care-
fully optimizing the dynamical ADC range, one can ex-
tract a nonzero amount of secure randomness even when
the classical noise is larger than the quantum noise. By
applying this method to our continuous-variable (CV)
QRNG based on a homodyne measurement of vacuum
state [23], we demonstrate that the setup is capable of
delivering more than 70 Gbps of secure random bits.
In most QRNGs, including this work, the measurement
device has to be calibrated and trusted. Recently, cer-
tifiable randomness based on a violation of fundamental
inequalities has been proposed and demonstrated [30–
32]. These devices do not rely on the assumption of a
trusted device. The generated bits can be certified as
random based on the measured correlations alone and
independent from the internal structure of the genera-
tor. However, achieving a high generation rate with such
devices is experimentally challenging.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec II, we
present the modelling of our CV QRNG and the quan-
tification of entropy via (conditional) min-entropy. We
outline the procedure of optimizing the dynamical ADC
range under different operating conditions and experi-
mental parameters. In Sec. III, we analyze and charac-
terize our CV QRNG based on our framework. We then
review and discuss the randomness extraction in our CV
QRNG, ending with brief concluding remarks in Sec. IV.
II. ENTROPY QUANTIFICATION
The main goal of entropy evaluation of a secure
QRNG is to quantify the amount of randomness avail-
able in the measurement outcome M , conditioned upon
side-information E, which might be accessible, con-
trollable, or correlated with an adversary. The con-
cept of side-information-independent randomness, which
includes privacy amplification and randomness extrac-
tion, is well established in both classical and quantum-
information theory [33–36]. This security aspect of
randomness generation started to get considerable at-
tention recently in the framework of QRNG [13, 20–
23, 26, 27, 37]. In particular, Ref. [37] examines the
amount of randomness extractable under various levels
of characterization of the device and power given to the
adversary.
In this paper, we consider randomness as independent
of classical side information, which arises from various
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Figure 1. Model of the n-bit ADC, with analog input in the
ADC dynamical range [−R + δ/2, R − 3δ/2] and bin width
δ = R/2n−1. We choose the central bin centred around 0,
the lowest bin imin = −2
n−1 centered around −R, and the
highest bin imax = 2
n−1 − 1 centered around R − δ.
sources of classical origin, such as technical electronic
noise and thermal noise. We look at the worst-case sce-
nario, namely that these parameters, in principle can be
known by the adversary either due to monitoring or con-
trolling of the classical noise, and, hence are untrusted.
In order to guarantee the security of the random bits
generated, we resort to the notion of min-entropy. This
quantity is directly related to the maximum probabil-
ity of observing any particular measurement outcome,
hence bounding the amount of knowledge of an adver-
sary. More specifically, the conditional min-entropy tells
us the amount of (almost) uniform and independent ran-
dom bits that one can extract from a biased random
source with respect to untrusted parameters. Our goal
here is to achieve the maximum amount of conditional
min-entropy by optimizing the measurement settings.
A. Characterization of noise and measurement
We first discuss the model for our CV QRNG. Follow-
ing our previous work [23], a homodyne measurement of
the vacuum state is performed. This measures Q, the
quadrature values of the vacuum state. The theory of
quantum mechanics states that these values are random
and have a probability density function (PDF) pQ which
is Gaussian and centred at zero with variance σ2M . In
practice, these quadrature values cannot be measured
in complete isolation from sources of classical noise E.
The measured signal M is then M = Q + E. Denot-
ing the PDF of the classical noise as pE , the resulting
measurement PDF, pM is then a convolution of pQ and
pE . Assuming that the classical noise follows a Gaussian
distribution centred at zero and with variance σ2E , the
measurement probability distribution is
pM (m) =
1√
2piσM
exp
(
− m
2
2σ2M
)
, (1)
for m ∈ M where the measurement variance σ2M =
σ2Q + σ
2
E . The ratio between the variances of the quan-
tum noise and the classical noise defines the QCNR,
3Figure 2. Numerical simulations for the measured distribution probabilities PMdis(mi) versus quadrature values, with different
dynamical ADC range parameters R = (a) 5, (b) 2 and (c) 8. Without optimization, one will have either an oversaturated or
unoccupied ADC bins, which will compromise both the rate and the security of the random-number generation. The parameters
used are n = 8 and QCNR= 10 dB. The quadrature values are normalized to quantum noise.
i.e. QCNR= 10 log10(σ
2
Q/σ
2
E). The sampling is per-
formed over an n-bit ADC with dynamical ADC range
[−R + δ/2, R − 3δ/2]. Upon measurement, the sam-
pled signal is discretized over 2n bins with bin width
δ = R/2n−1. The range is chosen so that the central
bin is centered at zero. The resulting probability distri-
bution of discretized signal Mdis reads
PMdis(mi)
=


∫ −R+δ/2
−∞ pM (m)dm, i = imin,∫mi+δ/2
mi−δ/2 pM (m)dm, imin < i < imax,∫∞
R−3δ/2 pM (m)dm, i = imax,
(2)
as shown in Fig. 1 andmi = δ×i, where the i are integers
∈ {−2n−1, ..., 2n−1 − 1}. The two extreme cases i = imin
and i = imax are introduced to model the saturation on
the first and last bins of an ADC with finite input range,
i.e. all the input signals outside [−R + δ/2, R − 3δ/2]
will be accumulated in the first and last bins. Figure 2
shows the discretized distribution PMdis(mi) with differ-
ent R. We see that an appropriate choice of dynamical
ADC range for a given QCNR and digitization resolution
n is crucial, since overestimating or underestimating the
range will either lead to excessive unused bins or unnec-
essary saturation at the edges of the bins [28], causing
the measurement outcome to be more predictable.
However, in designing a secure CV QRNG, R should
not be naively optimized over the measured distribution
PMdis(mi) but over the distribution conditioned on the
classical noise. The conditional PDF between the mea-
sured signal M and the classical noise E, pM|E(m|e) is
given by
pM|E(m|e) =
1√
2pi(σ2M − σ2E)
exp
[
− (m− e)
2
2(σ2M − σ2E)
]
=
1√
2piσQ
exp
[
− (m− e)
2
2σ2Q
]
. (3)
This is the PDF of the quantum signal shifted by the
classical noise outcome e. By setting σ2Q = 1, we nor-
malize all the relevant quantities by the quantum noise.
From Eq. (2), the discretized conditional probability dis-
tribution is, thus,
PMdis|E(mi|e)
=


∫ −R+δ/2
−∞ pM|E(m|e)dm, i = imin,∫mi+δ/2
mi−δ/2 pM|E(m|e)dm, imin < i < imax,∫∞
R−3δ/2 pM|E(m|e)dm, i = imax.
(4)
With these, we are now ready to discuss how R should
be chosen under two different definitions of min-entropy,
namely worst-case min-entropy and average min-entropy.
B. Worst-case conditional min-entropy
The min-entropy for variable X with distribution
PX(xi), in unit of bits, is defined as [35, 38]:
Hmin(X) = − log2
[
max
xi∈X
PX(xi)
]
. (5)
Operationally, this corresponds to entropy associated
with the maximum guessing probability for an eavesdrop-
per about X . It also tells us about how much (almost)
uniform randomness can be extracted out of the distribu-
tion PX(xi). To obtain a lower bound for the randomness
in our entropy source, we first look into the worst-case
min-entropy conditioned on classical side information K,
which is defined as [39]
Hmin(X |K)
= − log2
[
max
kj∈supp(PK)
max
xi∈X
PX|K(xi|kj)
]
, (6)
where the support supp(f) is the set of values xi such
that f(xi) > 0. In the case of Gaussian distributions, the
support of the probability distribution will be R. Follow-
ing Eq. (4), upon discretization of the measured signal
M , the worst-case min-entropy conditioned on classical
4Figure 3. Numerical simulations of: (a) conditional probability distributions PMdis|E(mi|e), with e = {−10σE , 0, 10σE} (from
left to right) and R = 5. Without optimizing R, when e = ±10σE , saturations in the first and last bins affect the maximum of
the conditional probability distribution. Inset: PMdis|E(mi|e), with e = {−100σE , 0, 100σE} (from left to right). Unbounded
classical noise will lead to zero randomness due to the oversaturation of dynamical ADC. (b) Optimized PMdis|E(mi|e), with
e = {−10σE , 0, 10σE} (from left to right). From Eq. (11), the optimal R is chosen to be 5.35. The saturations do not exceed
the maximum of the conditional probability distribution whenever −10σE ≤ e ≤ 10σE . The parameters are n = 8, QCNR= 10
dB. Dashed lines indicate mi = ±10σE . The quadrature values are normalized to vacuum noise.
noise E is
Hmin(Mdis|E) = − log2
[
max
e∈R
max
mi∈Mdis
PMdis|E(mi|e)
]
.
(7)
Here we assumed that from the eavesdropper’s perspec-
tive, the classical noise is known fully with arbitrary pre-
cision. Performing the integration in Eq. (4), the maxi-
mization over Mdis in Eq. (7) becomes
max
mi∈Mdis
PMdis|E(mi|e)
=max


1
2
[
1− erf
(
e+R−δ/2√
2
)]
,
erf
(
δ
2
√
2
)
,
1
2
[
erf
(
e−R+3δ/2√
2
)
+ 1
]
,
(8)
where erf(x) = 2/
√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt is the error function. We
note that we have maxe∈R maxmi∈Mdis PMdis|E(mi|e) = 1,
achieved when e → −∞ or e → ∞. This results in
Hmin(Mdis|E) = 0 [see inset of Fig. 3 (a)]. Indeed it
is intuitive to see that in the case where the classical
noise e takes on an extremely large positive value, the
outcome of Mdis is almost certain to be mimax with large
probability. However, this scenario happens with a very
small probability. Hence for practical purposes, one can
bound the maximum excursion of e, for example −5σE ≤
e ≤ 5σE , which is valid for 99.9999% of the time. With
this bound on the classical noise, we now have
max
e∈[emin,emax]
max
mi∈Mdis
PMdis|E(mi|e)
= max


1
2
[
1− erf
(
emin+R−δ/2√
2
)]
,
erf
(
δ
2
√
2
)
,
1
2
[
erf
(
emax−R+3δ/2√
2
)
+ 1
]
,
(9)
and when emin = emax,
Hmin(Mdis|E) = − log2
[
max
{
1
2
[
erf
(
emax −R+ 3δ/2√
2
)
+ 1
]
; erf
(
δ
2
√
2
)}]
, (10)
which can be optimized by choosing R such that
1
2
[
erf
(
emax −R+ 3δ/2√
2
)
+ 1
]
= erf
(
δ
2
√
2
)
. (11)
This optimized worst-case min-entropy Hmin(Mdis|E) is
directly related to the extractable secure bits that are in-
dependent of the classical noise. As shown in Fig. 3(a),
when Eq. (10) is not optimized with respect to R, the
saturation in the first (last) bin for emin/max = ±10σE
becomes the peaks of the conditional probability distri-
bution, hence compromising the attainable min-entropy.
By choosing the optimal value for R via Eq. (11), as de-
picted in Fig. 3(b), the peaks at the first and last bins will
always be lower than or equal to the probability within
the dynamical range. Thus, by allowing the dynamical
ADC range to be chosen freely, one can obtain the lowest
possible conditional probability distribution, and hence
5Figure 4. (a) Optimized Hmin(Mdis|E) and (b) normal-
ized Hmin(Mdis|E) as a function of QCNR for different n-bit
ADCs. Shaded areas: 5σE ≤ |e+∆| ≤ 20σE . The extractable
bits are robust against the excursion of the classical noise,
especially when the QCNR is large. A nonzero amount of se-
cure randomness is extractable even when the classical noise
is larger than the quantum noise. The extractable secure ran-
domness per bit increases as the digitization resolution n is
increased.
produce the highest possible amount of secure random
bits per sample for a given QCNR and n-bit ADC. Equa-
tion (10) can be further generalized to take into account
the direct current (dc) offset of the device ∆, which can
be due to an intrinsic offset of the electronic signal or even
a deliberate constant offset induced by the eavesdropper
over the sampling period [see Appendix A].
In Fig. 4(a), we show the extractable secure random
bits for different digitization n under the confidence in-
terval of 5σE ≤ |e + ∆| ≤ 20σE. At the high QCNR
regime, the classical noise contribution does not compro-
mise the extractable bits too much. As the classical noise
gets more and more comparable to the quantum noise,
although more bits have to be discarded, one can still
extract a decent amount of secure random bits. More
surprisingly, even if the QCNR goes below 0, that is,
classical noise becomes larger than quantum noise, in
Figure 5. Normalized worst-case conditional min-entropy
Hmin(Mdis|E) as a function of n-bit ADC for different QCNR
values. |∆| = 0 and |e| ≤ 5σE. The interplay between
the QCNR and digitization resolution n is shown, where one
can improve the rate of secure randomness per bit either by
improving the QCNR or increasing n. Inset: Zoom in for
Hmin(Mdis|E)/n ≥ 0.85 (dashed line). Even when the classi-
cal noise is more dominating compared to the quantum noise
(QCNR= −3 dB), 85 % of the randomness per bit can be
recovered by having at least approximately 22 bits of digiti-
zation.
principle, one can still obtain a nonzero amount of ran-
dom bits that are independent of classical noise. From
Fig. 4(b), we notice the extractable secure randomness
per bit increases as we increase the digitization resolu-
tion n. This interplay between the digitization resolu-
tion n and QCNR is further explored in Fig. 5, where
normalized Hmin(Mdis|E) is plotted against n for several
values of QCNR. We can see that for higher ratios of
quantum-to-classical-noise, a lesser amount of digitiza-
tion resolution is required to achieve a certain value of
secure randomness per bit. In other words, even if QCNR
cannot be improved further, one can achieve a higher ra-
tio of secure randomness per bit simply by increasing n.
C. Average conditional min-entropy
As described in Section II B, without a bound on the
range of classical noise, one cannot extract any secure
randomness. However, if we assume that an adversary
can only listen to, but has no control over the classical
noise, we can estimate the average chance of successful
eavesdropping with the average guessing probability of
Mdis given Edis [31, 35, 38],
Pguess(Mdis|Edis)
=

 ∑
ej∈Edis
PEdis(ej) max
mi∈Mdis
PMdis|Edis(mi|ej)

 , (12)
6Table I. Optimized H¯min(Mdis|E) (and R) for 8- and 16-bit
ADCs
QCNR (dB) n = 8 n = 16
∞ 7.03 (2.45) 14.36 (3.90)
20 6.93 (2.59) 14.28 (4.09)
10 6.72 (2.93) 14.11 (4.55)
0 6.11 (4.33) 13.57 (6.48)
-∞ 0 0
which denotes the probability of correctly predicting the
value of discretized measured signal Mdis using the op-
timal strategy, given access to discretized classical noise
Edis. Here PEdis(ej) is the discretized probability dis-
tribution of the classical noise. The extractable secure
randomness from our device is then quantified by the av-
erage conditional min-entropy
H¯min(Mdis|Edis) = − log2 Pguess(Mdis|Edis). (13)
Here, we again assume that the eavesdropper can mea-
sure the full spectrum of the classical noise, with arbi-
trary precision. This gives the eavesdropper maximum
power, including an infinite ADC range Re → ∞ and
infinitely small binning δe → 0. As detailed in Appendix
B, under these limits, Eq. (13) takes the form of
H¯min(Mdis|E)
= lim
δe→0
H¯min(Mdis|Edis)
= − log2
[∫ ∞
−∞
PE(e) max
mi∈Mdis
PMdis|E(mi|e)de
]
.
(14)
The full expression of Eq. (14) is shown in Eq. (B7).
The optimized result for the average min-entropy
H¯min(Mdis|E) with the corresponding dynamical ADC
range R is depicted in Table I. Similar to worst-case
min-entropy scenario in Sec. II B, one can still obtain
a significant amount of random bits even if the classical
noise is comparable to quantum noise. On the contrary,
a conventional unoptimized QNRG requires high oper-
ating QCNR to access the high-bitrate regime. When
QCNR→∞, the measured signal does not depend on the
classical noise and the result coincides with that of the
worst-case conditional min-entropy. In fact, the worst-
case conditional min-entropy [Eq. (7)] is the lower bound
for the average conditional min-entropy [Eq. (13)]. In
the absence of side-information E, both entropies will re-
duce to the usual min-entropy Eq. (5) [31]. Compared to
the worst-case min-entropy, the average conditional min-
entropy is more robust against degradation of QCNR;
hence, it allows one to extract more secure random bits
for a given QCNR. This is expected, since in this case,
we do not allow the eavesdropper to influence our device,
which is a valid assumption for a trusted laboratory.
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Figure 6. Schematic setup of CVQRNG, where a continuous-
variable homodyne detection is performed on the quantum
vacuum state, followed by mixing down at 1.375 GHz and
1.625 GHz. The mixing signals are generated by voltage-
controlled oscillators. The dynamical ADC range of the ADC
is chosen appropriately according to the QCNR and ADC
digitization resolution n to maximize the extractable ran-
domness. The raw output, which consists of both quantum
and classical contributions, will be postprocessed by field-
programmable gate array. A cryptographic hashing function
(AES-128) is applied to extract secure randomness quantified
by conditional min-entropy.
III. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
A. Physical setup and characterization
As depicted in Fig. 6, our CVQRNG setup consists of
a homodyne detection of the quantum vacuum state fol-
lowed by post-processing. A 1550-nm fibre-coupled laser
(NP Photonic Rock) operating at 60 mW serves as the
local oscillator of the homodyning setup. This local oscil-
lator is sent into one port of a 50:50 beam splitter, while
the other one is physically blocked and serves as the vac-
uum input. The outputs are then optically coupled to a
pair of balanced photodetectors with 30 dB of common-
mode rejection. The intensity of the output ports are
recorded over a detection bandwidth of 3 GHz. Since
the local oscillator’s amplitude α is significantly larger
than the quantum vacuum fluctuation, the difference of
the photocurrents from the pair of detectors is propor-
tional to |α|Xv, where Xv is the quadrature amplitude
of the vacuum state. Hence, the contribution of quantum
noise is essentially amplified via the balanced homodyne
detection.
In order to sample the vacuum field at the spectral
range where technical noise is less significant and where
the laser is shot-noise limited (see Fig. 7), the electronic
output is split and mixed down at 1.375 GHz and 1.625
GHz. Low-pass filters with cutoff frequency at 125 MHz
are used to minimize the correlations between the sam-
pling points [40] before digitizing with an appropriately
chosen dynamical ADC range parameter R. The mea-
sured signal from two sidebands (channel 0, 1.25-1.50
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Figure 7. Spectral power density from the CV-QRNG. The
measured signal is mixed down at 1.375 GHz and 1.625 GHz
(dashed lines), where the laser is shot-noise limited and far
from low-frequency technical noise. The QCNR clearances
are about 13 dB for both channels, which are sampled at 250
MSamples per second. The shaded region between the mea-
sured signal and classical noise indicates the available quan-
tum randomness in our broadband 3-GHz photocurrent de-
tectors, with an average QCNR of approximately 10 dB. The
peaks in the classical signal are due to technical noise and
pickup signals from radio stations. The peak at 2.4 GHz is
due to the Wi-Fi transmissions. The resolution and video
bandwidth are both 1 MHz.
GHz), and (channel 1, 1.50-1.75 GHz) are recorded us-
ing two 16-bit ADCs (National Instruments 5762) at 250
MSamples per second. Finally, the data processing is per-
formed using a National Instruments field-programmable
gate array.
The average QCNR clearances for channel 0 (ch 0)
and channel 1 (ch 1) are 13.52 and 13.32 dB, respec-
tively. Taking into account the intrinsic dc offsets, which
is−0.02σQ for both channels, we quantify our conditional
min-entropies using the method described in Sec. II. For
our ADC with 16 bits of digitization, the worst-case con-
ditional min-entropies are 13.76 bits (ch 0) and 13.75
bits (ch 1), while the average conditional min-entropies
are 14.19 bits for both channels. Here, by assuming that
the eavesdropper cannot manipulate the classical noise,
we evaluate our entropy with average conditional min-
entropy and set R as 4.32σQ according to Eq. (B8).
B. Upper bound of extractable min-entropy
The extractable randomness of our QRNG is limited by
the sampling rate and the digitization resolution, which
is defined by Nyquist’s theorem on maximum data rate
C,
C = 2H log2 V, (15)
where H is the bandwidth of the spectrum and V =
2n is the quantization level for digitization resolution n.
For our 16-bit ADC, the shot-noise-limited and technical-
noise-free bandwidth is around 2.5 GHz out of 3 GHz.
With an average of 10 dB of QCNR clearance, one can
extract 14.11 bits out of 16 bits (Table I). Putting these
values into Eq. (15), with a fast enough ADC, we can
potentially extract up to 70 Gbit/s random bits out of
our detectors.
The maximum bitrate is ultimately upper bounded
by the photon number within a given detection time
window. In our setup, a 1550-nm fibre-coupled laser
with power of 60 mW and detection bandwidth of 3
GHz is used. This corresponds to a mean of 1.6 × 108
photons per sampling. Given a perfect photon-number-
resolving detector, the maximum min-entropy is given
by − log2(1/
√
2pi × 1.6× 108) ≈ 14.9 bits (see Appendix
C). In principle, one can send more power to extract more
random bits, however, this bound can increase only log-
arithmically with laser intensity.
C. Randomness extraction
It is commonly the case that QRNGs are not ideal
sources of randomness, in the sense that the distribution
is often biased, while uniform randomness is required for
application purposes. In our situation, the quantum vac-
uum state measured by our CV QRNG exhibits a Gaus-
sian distribution. To generate ideal randomness, post-
processing of the raw outputs is necessary to produce
shorter, yet almost uniformly distributed random strings.
Ad hoc algorithms such as the Von Neumann extractor,
XOR corrector, and least significant bit operation are
widely used [4, 15, 16, 28, 29, 41]. These methods, al-
though simple in practice, might fail to produce random-
ness at all if non-negligible correlations exist among the
raw bits [42].
From an information-theoretic standpoint, universal
hashing functions are desirable candidates for random-
ness extraction [26, 33]. These functions act to recom-
bine bits within a sample according to a randomly chosen
seed, and map them to truncated, almost uniform ran-
dom strings. They constitute a strong extractor which
implies that the seed can be reused without sacrificing
too much randomness. In recent development of QRNGs
[20, 22, 26, 27, 43], they have been used to construct
hashing functions such as the Toeplitz-hashing matrix.
These constructions require a long (but reusable) seed
[44]. A different implementations of an information-
theoretic randomness extractor, the Trevisan’s extractor,
[26, 34, 36] has also received considerable attention. This
particular construction of a strong extractor has been
proven secure against quantum side-information, and,
furthermore, it requires a relatively short seed. Despite
so, the complexity of the algorithm imposes a very strin-
gent limit on the extraction speed (0.7 kb/s [26] and 150
kb/s [36]).
Another attractive alternative for secure randomness
extraction are cryptographic hashing functions [45–48].
8While these cryptographic hashing functions are not
information-theoretically proven to be secure, they are
still suited for many cryptographic applications and set-
tings where the adversary is assumed to be computa-
tionally bounded. The reason for utilizing them over
universal hashing functions is that they can have high
throughput due to efficient hardware implementation.
Previously, cryptographic hashing extractors have been
deployed in [11, 13, 18, 24], with functions such as SHA-
512 and Whirlpool. Most of the implementations keep
exactly min-entropy number of bits, which might not be
fully secure (see Appendix D).
Here, we demonstrate randomness extraction with
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [49] crypto-
graphic hashing algorithm of 128 bits (see Appendix E).
Since a detailed cryptoanalysis of our framework is non-
trivial and beyond the scope of this paper, we keep only
half of our conditional min-entropy [45, 50] to obtain
an almost perfectly uniform output. The final real-time
guaranteed-secure random number generation rate of our
CV QRNG is 3.55 Gbps. If all the available bandwidth
from our detector (approximately 2.5 GHz) can be sam-
pled, with sufficient resources, we can achieve up to 35
Gbit/s (cf. Sec. III B). This corresponds to a rate of 14
Mbps/MHz in term of bits per bandwidth. Our random
numbers consistently pass the standard statistical tests
(NIST [51], DieHard [52]) and the results are available
on the Australian National University Quantum Random
Number Server (https://qrng.anu.edu.au).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we propose a generic framework for se-
cure random-number generation, taking into account the
existence of classical side information, which, in princi-
ple could be manipulated or predicted by an adversary.
If the adversary is assumed to have access to the classical
noise, for example, the detectors’ noise can be originat-
ing from preestablished values, the worst-case conditional
min-entropy should be used to quantify the available se-
cure randomness. Meanwhile, if we restrict the third
party to passive eavesdropping, one can use the average
conditional min-entropy instead to quantify extractable
randomness. By treating the dynamical ADC range as a
free parameter, we show that QCNR is not the sole de-
cisive factor in generating secure random bits. Surpris-
ingly, one can still extract a nonzero amount of secure
randomness even when the classical noise is comparable
to the quantum noise. This is done simply by optimizing
the dynamical ADC range via conditional min-entropies.
Such an approach not only provides a rigorous justifica-
tion for choosing the suitable ADC parameter, but also
largely increases the range of QCNR for which true ran-
domness can be extracted, thus relaxing the condition of
high QCNR clearance in conventional CV QRNGs. We
also notice that we can increase the min-entropy per bit
simply by increasing the number of digitization bits. We
apply these observations to analyze the amount of ran-
domness produced by our CV QRNG setup. Efficient
cryptographic hashing functions are then deployed to ex-
tract randomness quantified by average conditional min-
entropy.
We note several possible extensions of our work. For
instance, one can apply entropy smoothing [39, 53] on
the worst-case min-entropy to tighten the analysis. Our
framework can also be generalized to encapsulate poten-
tial quantum side information by considering the analysis
described in Ref. [27]. A detailed cryptoanalysis of our
framework can also increase the final throughput of the
QRNG [47]. Last, a hybrid of an information-theoretic
provable and cryptographic randomness extractor is also
an interesting avenue to be explored in the construction
of a high-speed, side-information (classical and quantum)
proof QRNG [44].
To conclude, this work allows the maximization of ex-
tractable high-quality randomness without compromis-
ing both the integrity and the speed of a QRNG. In
fact, within our framework, when the QRNG is appro-
priately calibrated, the generated random numbers are
secure even if the electronic noise is fully known. This is
of practical importance, given the fact that QRNGs play
a decisive role in the implementation of cryptographic
protocols such as quantum key distribution. From a prac-
tical point of view, our method also relaxes the QCNR
requirement on the detector, thus allowing QRNGs that
are more cost effective and smaller in size. As such, we
believe that our work paves the way towards a reliable,
high bitrate, and environmentally-immune QRNG [54]
for information security.
Note added.- We note several recent papers considering
the security aspects of QRNGs [55–58]. A related work
by Mitchell et al. [59] was published recently. Similar
to our work, a lower bound of the average min-entropy
was established by assuming the worst-case behavior of
various untrusted experimental noise and errors. The
study asserts that high-bitrate randomness generation
with strong randomness guarantee remains possible even
under paranoid analysis, which supports our conclusion.
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Appendix A: Optimized conditional min-entropy
with dc offset
In a realistic scenario, the mean of the measured sig-
nal’s probability distribution is often nonzero. It is pos-
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Figure 8. Model of the n-bit ADC, with analog input in the
ADC dynamical range [−R + δ/2, R − 3δ/2] and bin width
δ = R/2n−1. Offset of the distribution is modeled by another
reference frame m′ centered at offset ∆. In the original frame
m, the lowest and highest bins are now centered around −R−
∆ and R − δ −∆.
sible that such an offset might be induced by a malicious
party over the sampling period. The model is depicted
in Fig. 8, where the offset ∆ of the distribution is cap-
tured by another reference frame m′ centered at ∆. In
this model, Eq. (4) can now be rewritten as
P
(∆)
Mdis|E(mi|e) =

∫ −R−∆+δ/2
−∞ pM ′|E(m
′|e)dm′, i = imin,∫m′i−∆+δ/2
m′i−∆−δ/2 pM
′|E(m′|e)dm′, imin < i < imax,∫∞
R−3δ/2−∆ pM ′|E(m
′|e)dm′, i = imax.
(A1)
Following the steps in Sec. II and bounding ∆, we finally
arrive at the generalization of Eq.(10),
Hmin(Mdis|E) = − log2max(c1, c2), (A2)
Here c1 =
1
2
[
erf
(
emax+∆max−R+3δ/2√
2
)
+ 1
]
and c2 =
erf
(
δ
2
√
2
)
. The results are tabulated in Tables II and
III.
Appendix B: Binning of electronic noise - from
eavesdropper’s perspective
From Eq. (2), the discretized electronic noise distribu-
tion on the eavesdropper’s ADC with dynamical range
Re and digitization ne is given by
PEdis(ej) =


∫ −Re+δe/2
−∞ pE(e)de, j = jmin,∫ ej+δe/2
ej−δe/2 pE(e)de, jmin < j < jmax,∫∞
Re−3δe/2 pE(e)de, j = jmax,
(B1)
where δe = Re/2
ne−1 is the corresponding bin width.
In order to achieve the lower bound of the average condi-
tional min-entropy described in Eq. (13), we imagine that
the eavesdropper possesses a device with infinite dynam-
ical ADC range and digitization bits, i.e. Re → ∞ and
ne →∞. As Re →∞, the first and last cases in Eq. (B1)
can be discarded, and we are left with
PEdis(ej) =
∫ ej+δe/2
ej−δe/2
pE(e)de. (B2)
To evaluate the expression for the discretized conditional
probability distribution, we make use of the mean value
theorem stated below:
Theorem 1 Mean value theorem: For any continuous
function f(x) on an interval [a, b], there exists some x¯ ∈
[a, b] such that,
∫ b
a
f(x)dx = (b − a)f(x¯) (B3)
By invoking Theorem 1, there exists e¯j ∈ [ej − δe/2, ej +
δe/2] such that Eq. (B2) can be written as
PEdis(ej) = pE(e¯j)δe. (B4)
Substituting this back to Eq. (12), we end up with
Pguess(Mdis|Edis)
=

 ∑
ej∈Edis
pE(e¯j)δe max
mi∈Mdis
PMdis|Edis(mi|ej)

 . (B5)
Assuming an infinite binning δe → 0, the sum becomes
an integral,
Pguess(Mdis|E)
= lim
δe→0
Pguess(Mdis|Edis)
=
[∫ ∞
−∞
pE(e) max
mi∈Mdis
PMdis|E(mi|e)de
]
.
(B6)
Together with Eq. (8), we finally arrive at
Pguess(Mdis|E)
=
[∫ ∞
−∞
pE(e) max
mi∈Mdis
PMdis|E(mi|e)de
]
=
1
2
(∫ e1
−∞
Pe(e)
[
1− erf
(
e+R− δ/2√
2
)]
de
+
[
erf
(
e2√
2σE
)
− erf
(
e1√
2σE
)]
erf
(
δ
2
√
2
)
+
∫ ∞
e2
Pe(e)
[
erf
(
e−R+ 3δ/2√
2
)
+ 1
]
de
)
,
(B7)
where e1 and e2 are chosen to satisfy the maximization
upon Mdis for a given R. The optimal R is then deter-
mined numerically. This result can be easily generalized
to take into account a dc offset with the steps described
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Table II. Optimized Hmin(Mdis|E) (and R) for an 8-bit ADC
QCNR (dB)
|e+∆|
0 5σE 10σE 15σE 20σE
∞ 7.03 (2.45) 7.03 (2.45) 7.03 (2.45) 7.03 (2.45) 7.03 (2.45)
20 6.79 (2.90) 6.58 (3.35) 6.40 (3.81) 6.23 (4.27)
10 6.37 (3.88) 5.91 (5.35) 5.55 (6.85) 5.26 (8.36)
0 5.50 (7.10) 4.75 (11.92) 4.25 (16.82) 3.88 (21.75)
-∞ 0 0 0 0
Table III. Optimized Hmin(Mdis|E) (and R) for a 16-bit ADC
QCNR (dB)
|e+∆|
0 5σE 10σE 15σE 20σE
∞ 14.36 (3.90) 14.36 (3.90) 14.36 (3.90) 14.36 (3.90) 14.36 (3.90)
20 14.20 (4.38) 14.05 (4.85) 13.91 (5.33) 13.79 (5.81)
10 13.89 (5.40) 13.53 (6.92) 13.25 (8.46) 13.00 (9.99)
0 13.20 (8.70) 12.56 (13.59) 12.12 (18.51) 11.77 (23.45)
-∞ 0 0 0 0
in Appendix A, giving
Pguess(Mdis|E)
=
1
2
(∫ e1
−∞
pE(e −∆)
[
1− erf
(
e+∆+R− δ/2√
2
)]
de
+
[
erf
(
e2 −∆√
2σE
)
− erf
(
e1 −∆√
2σE
)]
erf
(
δ
2
√
2
)
+
∫ ∞
e2
pE(e −∆)
[
erf
(
e+∆−R+ 3δ/2√
2
)
+ 1
]
de
)
,
(B8)
Appendix C: Upper bound on Hmin for limited laser
power
For a finite coherent state
∣∣α〉, the maximum value
of Hmin(Mdis|E) is bounded by the number of photons
available in
∣∣α〉. This limit is attained when the ADC
discretization is fine enough such that events between n
and n + 1 photons at the homodyne output can be dis-
tinguished (regardless of the amount of classical noise).
The probability density function pM|E(m|e = 0) is then
a probability mass function having support (n1 − n2)δ0
where n1 and n2 are non-negative integers with a Poisso-
nian distribution with mean |α|2 /2. The normalization
constant δ0 = 1/ |α| sets the variance to 1. For large |α|,
the distribution pM|E(m|e = 0) tends to a discretised
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance,
PMdis|E(m|e = 0) =
δ0√
2pi
exp
(−m2) , (C1)
for m ∈ {0,±δ0,±2δ0, . . .}. This function has a maxi-
mum value of δ0/
√
2pi at m = 0.
For an ADC discretization with bin size δ less than
δ0 and with range large enough such that the probabil-
ities of the two end bins given e, PMdis|E (mmin|e), and
PMdis|E (mmax|e) are less than δ0/
√
2pi, the most likely
bin given e will have a probability of δ0/
√
2pi. The min-
entropy of this distribution is then
Hmin(Mdis|e)
= − log2
[
max
m∈Mdis
PMdis|E(m|e)
]
= − log2
(
δ0√
2pi
)
= − log2
(
1√
2pi |α|
)
. (C2)
Averaging over e, this gives the bound to the average con-
ditional entropy as H¯min(Mdis|E) ≤ − log2
(
1/
√
2pi |α|).
Appendix D: Notes on the Leftover Hash Lemma
From an information-theoretic standpoint, the most
prominent advantage of universal hashing functions de-
scribed in Sec. III C is the randomness of the output
guaranteed unconditionally by the leftover hash lemma
(LHL). More specifically, LHL states that for any ε > 0,
if the output of an universal hashing function has length
l ≤ t− 2 log2(1/ε), (D1)
where t denotes the (conditional) min-entropy, then the
output will be ε-statistically close to a perfectly uniform
distribution [53]. Moreover, a universal hashing function
constructs a strong extractor, where the output string is
also independent of the seed of the function [26, 33].
On the other hand, for a strong cryptographic extrac-
tor, the output is ε′-computationally indistinguishable
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Figure 9. Autocorrelation plots of raw samples for (a) channel 0 and (b) channel 1 evaluated from a typical record of 107
consecutive samples. Each sample is 12 bits, where the four most significant bits are discarded from 16-bit raw data. The
low values of autocorrelation between the samples are consistent with our raw data being close to independent and identically
distributed random variables. Dashed lines show the theoretical standard deviation of truly random 107 points.
from the uniform distribution (see Refs. [46, 47] for for-
mal definitions). It is shown in Refs. [48, 53] that LHL
can be generalized to take into account almost universal
functions (functions statistically ξ-close to being univer-
sal hashing functions). This generalized LHL takes the
form of l = min(t, log2 (1/ξ)) − 2s, where s is an inte-
ger related to ε′. Under suitable parameter constraints
and operating modes, an ε′-cryptographic extractor can
be treated as a ξ-almost universal function, and, hence a
strong randomness extractor [47, 48]. Hence for a cryp-
tographic extractor, it is necessary to sacrifice some bits
according to the desired security parameter e to ensure
the security and uniformity of the output.
Appendix E: AES hashing and auto-correlation
In our QRNG, randomness extraction is performed
with an AES [49] cryptographic hashing algorithm of
128 bits seeded with a 128-bit secret initialization vec-
tor. Four most significant bits of the 16-bit samples are
discarded before randomness extraction to ensure low au-
tocorrelation among consecutive samples (Fig. 9) before
hashing. The resulting output is concatenated with par-
tial raw data from the previous run, forming a 128-bit
block for cryptographic hashing. Since a complete cyp-
toanalysis of the cryptographic hashing is intricate and
is out of the scope of our work, we simply discard half
of the output to ensure uniformity of the generated ran-
dom sequence [50]. We further strengthen our security
by renewing the seed of our AES extractor with these
discarded bits. The final real-time throughput of our CV
QRNG is 3.55 Gbits/s.
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